So here is why the conclusion is repugnant: because following an innocuous and reasonable-sounding chain of transitive preferences, any rational person (you included if you preferred B to A!) should prefer population Z to population A: you should prefer some astronomical number of people living lives barely worth living to a smaller number of people living extremely happy lives.

History and. Civilization. Melbourne. Trans Pacific Press. 2002. Arrhenius. Gustaf. Jesper Ryberg and Torbjörn. Tännsjö. The Repugnant Conclusion. 2006 

First, it seems clear to me that Z is not repugnant in itself. On face value, if people have lives worth living, it does not seem convincing to claim that such lives, everything else being equal, are repugnant in them- selves. 2006-02-16 · In Derek Parfit’s original formulation the Repugnant Conclusion is stated as follows: “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 1984). Tannsjo, Torbjorn, 2002.

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It is quite possible, from the point of view of hedonistic utilitarianism, that we should prefer a world with many sentient non-human animals who lead lives just worth living to a world with very happy, though not so many, people. The suggestions in the literature on how to deal with the Repugnant Conclusion can roughly be divided into eight categories: (1) introducing new ways of aggregating welfare into a measure of value; (2) questioning the way we can compare and measure welfare; (3) counting welfare differently depending on temporal or modal features; (4) revising the notion of a life worth living; (5) rejecting transitivity; (6) appeal to other values; (7) accepting the impossibility of a satisfactory population O N THE REPUGNANCE OF THE REPUGNANT CONCLUSION 129 ments about the conclusion and justify why Tannsjo needs another argu- ment. First, it seems clear to me that Z is not repugnant in itself. On face value, if people have lives worth living, it does not seem convincing to claim that such lives, everything else being equal, are repugnant in them- selves. Put differently, he embraces what philosophers call the “repugnant conclusion”: the idea that adding more humans with good lives is always valuable, and so we should aim for the biggest Tannsjo has argued that we don’t have a very good handle on what life at Z would be like, that it might well be rather good by contemporary standards, and so, that we shouldn’t take the repugnant conclusion to count significantly against classical utilitarianism (Tannsjo 2015).

2002.

the name, the repugnant conclusion is a situation that most philosophers deem as something bad and something which should be avoided, except for Tännsjö 

Ryberg, J., and T. Tännsjö (eds. ) 2004. The Repugnant Conclusion.

2015-08-26 · The piece was related to a philosophical idea known as the "repugnant conclusion" — basically, that there's a moral obligation to maximize the human population's size because more humans means

Abstract. Total views imply what Derek Parfit has called 'the  I will present Tännsjö's argument from his article “Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant. Conclusion”.

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The Repugnant Conclusion. Essays on Population Ethics  The spectre of the repugnant conclusion and the search for a population axiology has considered (Part, 1984; Portmore, 1999; Tännsjö, 2002; Arrhenius, n.d.). Total Utilitarianism implies the Repugnant Conclusion, which says that, for every Torbjörn Tännsjö offers a related account of how large numbers distort.

16 Feb 2006 If there are no possible lives with a very high quality of life, then the Repugnant Conclusion is vacuously true, since the antecedent—“[f]or any  Torbjörn Tännsjö, Stockholm University, Philosophy Department, Faculty Member . Why derek parfit had reasons to accept the repugnant conclusionmore. of population ethics have been devised to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, but 1996; Fotion 1997; Tännsjö 2002; and Broome 2004, pp. 210–14.
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Feb 25, 2016 Kimberly appear to be nice explaining that she is closing the bills and the earliest date they can issue my refund will be March 10… and then 

The repugnant conclusion has flummoxed philosophers since its appearance in such works as Derek Parfit’s . Reasons and Persons. The conclusion, that, for any world of people living very good lives, there is another, better, world of far more people living far worse lives, struck Parfit as deeply unintuitive, which drove him to label it repugnant. 1 The Repugnant Conclusion, according to Parfit, goes The Repugnant Conclusion: Compared with the existence of many people who would all have some very high quality of life, there is some much The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics: 15: Ryberg, Jesper, Tannsjo, Torbjorn, T. Nnsj, Torbj Rn: Amazon.com.au: Books The specific story (link concerned his decision not to publish a controversial piece by Swedish philosopher Torbjorn Tannsjo leading to the “repugnant conclusion” that procreation (as much as possible, at least within marriage perhaps) is a moral responsibility and prerequisite for everyone. 2010-12-15 · This is the first volume devoted entirely to the cardinal problem of modern population ethics, known as 'The Repugnant Conclusion'. This book is a must for (moral) philosophers with an interest in population ethics. Buy (ebook) Repugnant Conclusion by Jesper Ryberg, Torbjorn Tannsjo, eBook format, from the Dymocks online bookstore.